Focal Point Theory Test of Behavior and Attitudes

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Summary: Economic theories of legal compliance emphasize legal sanctions, whereas psychological and sociological theories stress the perceived legitimacy of law. Without disputing the importance of either mechanism, this study tests a third way that law affects behavior, an expressive theory that claims law influences behavior by creating a focal point around which individuals coordinate. The study examined how various forms of third-party "cheap talk" influence the behavior of subjects in a Hawk/Dove or Chicken game. Despite the players' conflicting interests, it was found that messages highlighting an equilibrium tend to produce that outcome. Most striking, this result emerged even when the message was selected by an overtly random, mechanical process. A similar result was obtained when the message was delivered by a third-party subject; the latter effect was significantly stronger than the former only when the subject speaker was selected by a merit-based process. These results suggest that, in certain circumstances, law generates compliance not only by sanctions and legitimacy, but also by facilitating coordination around a focal outcome

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Summary: Economic theories of legal compliance emphasize legal sanctions, whereas psychological and sociological theories stress the perceived legitimacy of law. Without disputing the importance of either mechanism, this study tests a third way that law affects behavior, an expressive theory that claims law influences behavior by creating a focal point around which individuals coordinate. The study examined how various forms of third-party "cheap talk" influence the behavior of subjects in a Hawk/Dove or Chicken game. Despite the players' conflicting interests, it was found that messages highlighting an equilibrium tend to produce that outcome. Most striking, this result emerged even when the message was selected by an overtly random, mechanical process. A similar result was obtained when the message was delivered by a third-party subject; the latter effect was significantly stronger than the former only when the subject speaker was selected by a merit-based process. These results suggest that, in certain circumstances, law generates compliance not only by sanctions and legitimacy, but also by facilitating coordination around a focal outcome

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